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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Political connections are widespread all around the world, especially in developing countries 
where institutions are less well-established, and regulations and laws are weak. Under such 
circumstances, to “get things done”, firms have to build connections with bureaucratic officials. 
However, this could hinder economic development. As a result, a number of countries took action 
to try to deal with this problem and China is a very noticeable case among them. Shortly after 
taking the position of the president of China, on December 4, 2012, Xi Jin-Ping announced a new 
“Eight-point Policy” which limits state-owned enterprises (hereafter, SOEs) top managers’ scope 
for extracting private benefits and curtails officials accepting private benefits from others (Lin et 
al., 2017). This is so-called “anti-corruption campaign (hereafter, the campaign)”.  
 
After this campaign was implemented, researchers began to examine the effects of the campaign 
on Chinese listed firms. Griffin et al. (2016) study the effects of the campaign and document an 
overall reduction in measures of potential corporate self-dealing, suggesting that the campaign has 
changed Chinese corporate culture. Then some other researchers such as Ke et al. (2016), Lin et 
al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017) investigate the effect of the campaign on stock prices. However, 
the stock price reaction indicates the perceptions of the future, not the future itself (Ross et al., 
2015). The influence of the campaign on investment activity, a critical factor affecting firms’ goal 
of maximizing shareholder wealth, is still unexplored. This study, therefore, fills this void by 
examining the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on investment behavior. In addition, little 
previous research investigates the influence of the loss of politically connected independent 
directors on corporate investment activity. This study thus also investigates this issue by separating 
the political-connected firms into independent director-connected and non- independent director-
connected subgroups to determine if the campaign effects are mainly driven by politically 
connected independent directors and/or by other political linkages.  
 
Chinese listed firms are studied due to the following reasons: first, with a population of 1.3 billion, 
China is the second largest economy and the largest emerging market in the world nowadays. It 
has also been the largest contributor to world growth since the global financial crisis of 2008 
(World Bank, 2017). Second, in China, governments control the allocation of resources and 
because of this, firms, especially Non-SOEs, build political connections to overcome difficulties 
such as fundraising. Previous research proposes that corruption is done through political 
connections. Therefore, the anti-corruption campaign is a good natural experiment to examine the 
effects on the listed firms in China. Finally, there are SOEs and Non-SOEs in China; the former 
are owned and normally run by governments while the latter have less relationship with 
governments. They thus have very different situations. SOEs are known to have overinvestment 
problem, in contrast, Non-SOEs face financial constraints and in turn, underinvestment problem. 
This anti-corruption campaign offers a natural experiment since it is an exogenous shock, and thus 
the association between the campaign and firm investment efficiency is free from an endogeneity 
problem.  
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study complements stock price 
reaction literature such as Ke et al. (2016), Lin et al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017). Stock price 
response incorporates investors’ perceptions around event dates, however, the expectation may not 
be the future reality itself. This study analyzes the possible changes in corporate investment 
behavior after the campaign to shed light on the real effect of the campaign on all types of firms, 
including SOEs and Non-SOEs with political connections. Second, this research extends the work 
of Pan et al. (2017) who identify 104 politically connected firms that are involved in the corruption 
cases (bribing firms). In this study we test the campaign effect with a much broader sample, 
including all Chinese listed firms originally. The findings show the campaign effect on the whole 
Chinese stock markets rather than only the effect on the event firms involved in the corruption 
cases. Third, this study extends the literature on political connection-investment efficiency 
relation. Previous research such as Chen et al. (2011a) and Xu et al. (2011) investigate the relation 
between political connection and investment efficiency and this study documents that this relation 
could be changed by exogenous factors such as anti-corruption campaign. Fourth, this study tries 
to clarify if the anti-campaign effect is the whole stock market phenomenon or only the firms with 
politically connected independent directors are affected. By doing so, it sheds light on the channels 
through which the campaign influences the relation between political connection and investment 
efficiency. Fifth, this study complements Fan (2016), Ye and Li (2017) as well as Tang et al. 
(2016), who all investigate the stock price response of the loss of politically connected directors, 
by examining the influence of the change in political independent directors on investment 
behavior. Finally, the findings of this research demonstrate the impact of the campaign, that is, 
whether the campaign really works to change something of Chinese listed firms or not. This is 
critical and intriguing since the institutions, regulations and laws all almost remain the same, and 
can only cutting off the political connections lead Chinese listed firms to the right way? We address 
this issue.  
 
We have organized the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and discussion. Section 5 is devoted to robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the study and 
offers suggestions. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
2.1. Political connections in China  
 
Political connections are prevalent, especially in emerging economies where the government still 
controls over firms’ access to financial resources and investment projects (Liu et al., 2016). Non-
SOEs in China encounter a disadvantage relative to SOEs (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). Political 
connections, therefore, help firms operating in weak institutional environments overcome market 
and institutional obstacles and pursue favorable treatment from the government (Li et al. 2008; 
Wu et al. 2012). As a result, Non-SOEs have the incentives to deal with these unfavorable 
treatments by establishing political connections.  
 
Political connection could lead firms to have both costs and benefits. For Non-SOEs the benefits 
include better access to capital markets such as gaining bank loans and issuing stocks at favorable 
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rates (Chan, Dang and Yan, 2012), political ties make Non-SOEs be able to secure contracts with 
the government and its affiliated parties, including capital financing, operational contracts and 
even direct subsidies (Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, with political experience, 
politically connected directors could contribute experience and information or help firms cope with 
government affairs legally. Wu, Wu and Rui (2012) claim that Non-SOEs politically connected 
managers try to obtain favorable treatment from the government, thereby increasing their firm 
value.  
 
In contrast, politically connected managers for SOEs have to achieve social-economic goals such 
as decreasing unemployment rate and increasing local GDP rather than to maximizing firm value. 
Furthermore, it is unnecessary for SOEs to build political connections for favorable treatment from 
governments (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). Government ownership brings disadvantages to SOEs, 
especially for local SOEs, because their controlling shareholders are local governments. To reach 
social and political objectives such as lower unemployment rate and higher regional GDP, local 
governments can powerfully get involved in SOEs’ operations (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). In China, 
governments have influence over appointing SOEs’ key executives and the ability to secure bank 
loans, access to equity markets or even state subsidies (DeFond et al. 2000; Fan et al. 2008; Wang 
et al. 2008; Hung et al. 2012; Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, connected firms are found 
to be less efficient than unconnected counterparts (Chan, Dang and Yan, 2012), significantly 
decreasing investment efficiency for SOEs (Chen et al., 2011b; Fan, 2016) and losing 
independence from governments (Marquis and Qian, 2013). In contrast, central SOEs mainly keep 
control over key industries and guarantee national economy safety rather than pursue political 
objectives (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). 
 
In summary, political connections bring Non-SOEs benefits which are greater than the costs while 
for SOEs, the costs for political connections may be greater than the benefits, especially for local 
SOEs. 
 
2.2. Anti-corruption campaign, political connections and investment behavior 
 
The campaign may destroy political connections and harm politically connected firms’ future 
opportunities to contract with the government and thus losing the benefits related to these contracts 
(Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). After the campaign, corruption-related firms may lose their 
connections with the corrupt bureaucrats, and this may hurt the connection-related benefits. Lin et 
al. (2017) note that the reforms are expected to prevent influential officials and all top party cadres 
from demanding bribes for removing regulations which hamper market mechanisms and also harm 
Non-SOEs from investing in “connections” with officials to “get things done”. However, the 
effects of the campaign may vary depending on the ownership type. For SOEs, they are originally 
politically-connected due to the high government ownership, it may not be necessary for them to 
build political connections and even when they have political connections, these connections may 
not bring additional benefits to SOEs but lead to higher costs related to lowering unemployment 
rate and enhancing local GDP, which cause lower investment efficiency. After the campaign, if 
the political connections are lessened, the connected SOEs’ investment efficiency may be 
improved. 
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In contrast, for Non-SOEs, before the campaign, politically-connected firms negotiate government 
contracts and preferential treatment more easily (Boubakri et al., 2012), however, the benefits 
could disappear as these firms lose their connections after the campaign. Xu et al. (2013) argue 
that political connections help a firm reduce financial friction and obtain more external resources 
at a lower cost, which can mitigate the underinvestment problem. When the campaign took effect, 
however, Non-SOE politically-connected firms may lose this connection and also the related 
benefits. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H1: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected Non-SOEs (PC Non-SOEs) 
have lower investment efficiency than that before the campaign. 
H2: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected SOEs (PC SOEs) have 
higher investment efficiency than that before the campaign. 
 
After the campaign, political connections may be destroyed, as a result, for PC SOEs, they may 
assume less pressure to achieve socio-economic objectives such as increasing local GDP, leading 
to less severe overinvestment, in turn lowering investment expenditures. In addition, for PC Non-
SOEs, their investment expenditures may also decrease because they may lose political 
connections and the advantages resulting from the connection. This study thus hypothesizes: 
 
H3: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower investment 
expenditures than that before. 
 
2.3. Anti-corruption, independent directors and investment behavior  
 
As previous research argues that independent directors play monitoring and consulting roles in 
developed markets, however, in an institutional setting with weak investor protection and strong 
government intervention, they may also play a political role. Ye and Li (2017) propose that 
politically connected independent directors can build a bridge between firms and politicians, 
helping firms to circumvent policy risks and secure regulatory rent. In China, the anti-corruption 
regulation requires that former and incumbent government officers could serve as directors without 
compensation or perquisites, only if the Organization Department authorizes (Xu, 2018). The 
campaign seems to work as Xu (2018) finds that after the anti-corruption regulation was 
implemented, from November 2013 to September 2014, the number of independent directors 
resigned per month increased from 20 to more than 80, and then back to 50 and around one fourth 
of independent directors’ resignations are due to the regulation. Tang et al. (2016) document, in 
their research examining the impact of forced politically connected directors on firm value in 
China, that firms with politically connected directors their stock prices drop significantly on the 
announcements of the anti-corruption campaign and also of the resulting director resignation. Xu 
(2018) reports that the channels through which the anti-corruption regulation hampers firm value 
are believed to be financial constraints and government expropriation, and to follow the anti-
corruption regulation, firms could modify their board characteristics, investment as well as 
operation policies. This research goes a step further to examine whether the campaign effects, if 
any, mainly result from the possible loss of politically connected independent directors and 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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H4:  After the anti-corruption campaign, PC Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency resulting 
from the resignation of politically connected directors. 
H5:  After the anti-corruption campaign, PC SOEs have higher investment efficiency resulting 
from the resignation of politically connected directors. 
H6:  After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower 
investment expenditures resulting from the resignation of politically connected directors. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data 
 
This study examines the moderating effect of the anti-corruption campaign on the relation between 
political connections and investment behavior by comparing the difference of investment 
expenditures as well as investment efficiency before and after the anti-corruption campaign for 
Chinese politically connected firms. Using Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (hereafter, CSMAR) databases, this research collects data on 
Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2016. Overall, the original sample includes 3,178 of Chinese 
listed firms. Following previous studies, this research excludes firms in financial industries, since 
their financial reports are different from those of other industries. This study also deletes firms 
which have no financial data (missing information) in all the variables we need in this research.  
 
This study uses a dummy variable, ANTI, to proxy for the anti-corruption campaign, which began 
to be carried out by the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 
(Pan and Tian, 2017). To take ownership type into consideration, the overall sample is divided into 
two groups, SOEs and Non-SOEs. Following Chen et al. (2011b), this study determines the nature 
of ownership type from the annual report. A firm is classified as an SOE if it is ultimately 
controlled by the government, including the central government, local governments at the 
provincial, municipal, and county level, as well as other governmental institutions. A firm is 
defined to be a Non-SOE when its ultimate controlling shareholder is an individual or a non-state 
entity, such as a town–village enterprise, foreign enterprise, or other non-state-controlled 
enterprises. This study manually collects background information about top executives from the 
annual report disclosure contained in the CSMAR database.  
 
To deal with outliers, this study firstly fills the missing data by means of each variable, then follows 
Pan and Tian (2017) to winsorize those by 1% of top-and-bottom of all continuous variables. The 
final sample in this study consists of 19,000 firm-years observations of 2,411 of Chinese listed 
firms.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
To investigate the impact of the campaign on the investment behavior of Chinese listed firms, 
following Pan and Tian (2017), Stein (2003), and Chen et al. (2011b), this study regresses 
investment expenditures on Tobin’s Q and relevant control variables. The main variables in this 
study are Tobin’s Q and ANTI. This study firstly investigates whether investment expenditures 
and investment efficiency are affected by the campaign using model (1):  
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INV୧,୲ = α଴ + αଵTQ୧,୲ିଵ + αଶANTI୧,୲ + αଷTQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲ + αସCFO୧,୲ +   αହLev୧,୲ିଵ +
                 α଺Size୧,୲ + α଻SALES୧,୲ିଵ + α଼TANGI୧,୲ +  Firm fixed effects +
                 Year fixed effects + ε୧,୲               (1) 
Where the dependent variable INV is a firm's investment expenditures in a year. Following Chen 
et al. (2011b) and Xu et al. (2011), INV is defined as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible 
assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling 
these assets, scaled by the beginning total assets. In this study, TQ is a firm’s beginning-of-year 
Tobin’s Q. Firms with more valuable investment opportunities are likely to invest more. TQ is 
calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value 
of equity and liabilities. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign 
applied, and 0 for otherwise. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of 
before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms.  
 
To be consistent with the literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2011b; Xu et al., 2013; Pan and Tian, 2017), 
this study includes several control variables in the models.  CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating 
cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one 
time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one time period ratio of net 
sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets. 
Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. Moreover, to investigate whether Chinese 
politically connected firms for both SOEs and Non-SOEs have different investment efficiency, the 
overall sample is partitioned into SOEs and Non-SOEs two groups, then, each group is further 
separated into politically connected and non-politically connected subgroups, respectively. 
Finally, this study separately does analysis using model (2). 
 
INV୧,୲ = α଴ + αଵTQ୧,୲ିଵ + αଶANTI୧,୲ + αଷPC୧,୲ + αସTQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲ +    αହTQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ PC୧,୲ +
                 α଺ ANTI୧,୲ ∗ PC୧,୲ + α଻TQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲ ∗ PC୧,୲ + α଼CFO୧,୲ + αଽLev୧,୲ିଵ  + αଵ଴Size୧,୲ +
                 αଵଵSALES୧,୲ିଵ +   αଵଶTANGI୧,୲ + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ε୧,୲        (2)     
                                             
Where SOE is a dummy variable, when comparing SOEs with Non-SOEs, SOE variable is state-
owned enterprises, which is equal to one for SOEs and zero otherwise. PC is a proxy for a firm’s 
political connections to the government. Following prior studies (Faccio, 2006, 2010; Xu et al., 
2013; Ma et al., 2013; Su et al., 2014), a firm is classified as politically connected if the 
Chairperson, CEO or one of the board of directors is an ex- or current government bureaucrat, or 
is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in which case it has a value of 1; zero otherwise. Thus, we use political 
connection (PC) as a dummy variable, which equal to 1 for politically connected firms and 0 for 
non-politically connected firms. TQ*ANTI*PC is the interaction among Tobin's Q, the anti-
corruption campaign, and PC. This research predicts (H1) that, for Non-SOEs subgroup, the 
coefficient of TQ*ANTI*PC, α଻  , is negative, suggesting that after the campaign, Chinese 
politically connected Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency than before the campaign. In 
contrast, for SOEs subgroup, the coefficient of TQ*ANTI*PC, α଻, is expected to be positive (H2), 
suggesting that after the campaign, PC SOEs have higher investment efficiency than before the 
campaign. Finally, for SOEs subgroup, the coefficient of ANTI୧,୲, α଺, is expected to be negative 
(H3), indicating that after the campaign, PC SOEs have lower investment expenditures than before.  
Finally, to investigate the effect of politically connected director resignation on firm investment 
behavior, this study separately does regression analysis using model (3). 
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INV୧,୲        =    α଴ + αଵTQ୧,୲ିଵ + αଶANTI୧,୲ + αଷ △ POLDIR୧,୲ +  αସTQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲
+         αହTQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗  △ POLDIR୧,୲ + α଺ANTI୧,୲ ∗△ POLDIR୧,୲ + α଻TQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲
∗  △ POLDIR୧,୲  + α଼CFO୧,୲ + αଽLev୧,୲ିଵ  + αଵ଴Size୧,୲ + αଵଵSALES୧,୲ିଵ
+ αଵଶTANGI୧,୲ + Firm fixed effects +  Year fixed effects + ε୧,୲ 
                  (3) 
Where △ POLDIR୧,୲ is the change in the number of politically connected independent directors or 
the percentage of politically connected independent directors, equal to the number of politically 
connected independent directors of year t minus the number of year t-1.  For PC Non-SOEs, the 
coefficient of TQ୧,୲ିଵ ∗ ANTI୧,୲ ∗△ POLDIR୧,୲ , that is α଻ , is expected to be negative (H4), 
suggesting that after the campaign, PC Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency resulting from 
the loss of politically connected directors. In contrast, for politically-connected SOEs, the 
coefficient is predicted to be positive, indicating that after the campaign, PC SOEs have higher 
investment efficiency resulting from the loss of politically connected directors. Finally, for PC 
SOEs, the coefficient of ANTI୧,୲ ∗△ POLDIR୧,୲, α଺, is predicted to be negative, suggesting that 
after the campaign, PC SOEs have lower investment expenditures resulting from the loss of 
politically connected directors. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and results of differences in mean analysis between PC Non-
SOEs and PC Central SOEs as well as PC Local SOEs (politically connected SOEs controlled by 
local governments) before and after the campaign. It can be seen from the table that, compared 
with the pre-anti period, all types of firms, including PC Non-SOEs, PC Central SOEs and PC 
Local SOEs, have lower investment level and Tobin’s Q after the campaign, supporting Hypothesis 
3 that after the campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower investment expenditures 
than that before the campaign. In addition, debt ratio (Lev) decreases significantly for PC Non-
SOEs, however, it increases significantly for both PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs. This 
implies that after the campaign, it should be more difficult for PC Non-SOEs to raise debt from 
state-owned banks due to the loss of political connections compared with that before the campaign. 
Finally, PC NSOEs have much lower sales after the campaign, the difference is negative and 
significant at the 1% level while the sales for both PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs have little 
change. It suggests that the campaign really negatively harms PC NSOEs’ operating activities.  
 
In summary, the results suggest that the campaign does indeed affect Chinese politically connected 
firms, in that all three types of firms have much lower investment expenditures and Tobin’s Q after 
the campaign compared with that before the campaign. Furthermore, after the campaign, PC Non-
SOEs experience a significant reduction in financial leverage and sales, while both PC Central 
SOEs and PC Local SOEs do not decrease or even increase. These results suggest that the 
campaign lowers the investment opportunities and investment level for all Chinese politically 
connected firms.  In addition, the loss of political connections for Non-SOEs harms their abilities 
to raise funds from state-owned banks and that of doing business with public institutions. 
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Table 1. The Descriptive Statistics and the Differences in Mean and Median of Variables of PC Non-SOEs, PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs  
 
Var. 
PC Non-SOEs   Difference   PC SOEs Central   Difference 
N  
Mean 
  
Median 
 
 
 
 N 
Mean 
  
Median 
 
 
Before After Before After t-value z-value Before After Before After t-value z-value 
INV 6786 0.054 0.045 0.039 0.033 -6.577*** -5.505*** 625 0.063 0.035 0.047 0.026 -6.915*** -4.152*** 
TQ 6786 2.893 1.855 1.836 1.301 -17.651*** -17.019*** 625 2.344 1.300 1.656 0.990 -7.070*** -11.942*** 
CFO 6786 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.832 -1.170 625 0.046 0.036 0.046 0.036 -1.449 -3.445*** 
LEV 6786 0.525 0.467 0.496 0.461 -7.180*** -4.343*** 625 0.529 0.587 0.547 0.590 2.702*** -3.639*** 
SIZE 6786 9.420 9.650 9.370 9.570 15.619*** -15.919*** 625 9.850 10.020 9.660 9.910 2.515** -9.590*** 
SALE 6786 0.696 0.631 0.573 0.503 -5.003*** -6.271*** 625 0.798 0.806 0.661 0.683 0.150 -1.564 
TANGI 6786 0.228 0.232 0.190 0.198 0.898 -1.168 625 0.274 0.228 0.214 0.170 -2.485** -1.839* 
                    
 
Var. 
  PC SOEs Local   Difference 
 
 N 
Mean 
  
Median 
 
 
Before After Before After t-value z-value 
INV 1121 0.058 0.048 0.041 0.033 -2.545** -2.281** 
TQ 1121 2.283 1.289 1.575 0.776 -7.288*** -10.521*** 
CFO 1121 0.054 0.037 0.054 0.035 -2.952*** -3.400*** 
LEV 1121 0.529 0.570 0.542 0.577 2.559** -2.950*** 
SIZE 1121 9.600 9.970 9.570 9.960 9.586*** -9.258*** 
SALE 1121 0.701 0.641 0.580 0.535 -1.603 -0.929 
TANGI 1121 0.299 0.285 0.276 0.253 -1.058 -1.181 
           
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the descriptive statistics and the differences in mean and median of variables of PC Non-SOEs, PC Central 
SOEs and PC Local SOEs. SOEs are state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOEs are otherwise. PC SOEs Central is politically connected SOEs controlled by the central government while PC SOEs Local is politically 
connected SOEs controlled by local governments.  INV is defined as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling these assets, 
scaled by the beginning total assets. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. This study includes several control variables in the 
models.  CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one 
time period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets.
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4.2 The effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically connected firms 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results for the effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of 
different ownership types. As can be seen from the table, all coefficients on ANTI are negative 
and significant at the 1% level from Column I to Column IV, indicating that the investment level 
of all types of firms significantly decreases after the campaign. This result is consistent with the 
finding in Table 1 and supports our Hypothesis 3 that after the campaign, Chinese politically 
connected firms have lower investment expenditures than that before the campaign. Regarding the 
influence of the campaign on investment efficiency, Column I shows that the coefficient on 
TQ*ANTI is positive but insignificant at conventional levels. When the SOEs are divided into 
Central SOEs and Local SOEs, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI is insignificant at conventional levels 
for Central SOEs while that for Local SOEs is positive and significant at the 5% level. This result 
suggests that after the campaign, the investment efficiency of PC SOEs has little change, however, 
that of Local SOEs is enhanced, implying that Local SOEs benefits more than Central SOEs in 
investment efficiency from the campaign. This finding partially supports our Hypothesis 2 that 
after the campaign, Chinese politically connected SOEs have higher investment efficiency than 
that before the campaign. Finally, Column IV shows that the coefficient on TQ*ANTI is positive 
and significant at the 5% level, indicating an increase in investment efficiency for Non-SOEs after 
the campaign. This result is not consistent with our Hypothesis 1, one possible reason is that after 
the campaign, Non-SOEs overinvest less due to the difficulty to raise funds from state-owned 
banks or they make investment decisions more cautiously due to the loss of political connections, 
thereby mitigating the overinvestment problem. 
 
Table 2. The Effect of the Campaign on the Investment Behavior of Politically Connected Firms 
          VARIABLE I II III IV 
 SOE SOE-Central SOE-Local Non-SOE 
     C 0.0080 0.1369 0.0707 0.0369 
 (0.1236) (1.2095) (0.6787) (1.1530) 
TQ 0.0015** 0.0006 0.0014 0.0004 
 (2.0435) (0.4587) (1.2730) (1.0860) 
ANTI -0.0241*** -0.0244*** -0.0267*** -0.0207*** 
 (-5.4503) (-3.4150) (-4.0338) (-10.3565) 
TQ*ANTI 0.0032 -0.0016 0.0090** 0.0016** 
 (1.3708) (-0.4784) (2.3585) (2.4729) 
CFO 0.0010 0.0224 -0.0064 0.0265*** 
 (0.0591) (0.8121) (-0.2600) (2.9915) 
LEV -0.0416*** -0.0219 -0.0449*** -0.0364*** 
 (-4.6218) (-1.3169) (-3.6655) (-10.9569) 
SIZE 0.0106 -0.0010 0.0046 0.0057* 
 (1.6159) (-0.0847) (0.4260) (1.7050) 
SALE -0.0017 -0.0183** 0.0078 -0.0029 
 (-0.3597) (-2.3226) (1.1807) (-1.0604) 
TANGI -0.1127*** -0.1564*** -0.1382*** -0.0738** 
 (-7.6049) (-5.1604) (-6.7385) (-8.8705) 
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Table 2 (continued)     
     
Cross-section fixed 
(dummy variables) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7126 0.7880 0.7183 0.5972 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5407 0.6478 0.5085 0.4652 
F-statistic 4.1450*** 5.6181*** 3.4230*** 4.5237*** 
N 1895 566 1027 5765 
     
     *, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the 
effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically connected firms. INV is defined as cash payments for 
fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling 
these assets, scaled by the beginning total assets. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the 
campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided 
by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference 
of before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. This study includes several control 
variables in the models.  CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total 
assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one 
time period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total 
assets. Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
4.3 The effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically-connected and non-
politically connected firms – a Difference-in-Differences test. 
 
Even though the anti-corruption campaign is an exogenous shock which causes little endogeneity 
problem, we still use difference-in-differences method to deal with this issue. The results are 
reported in Table 36. Columns I to IV show that the coefficients on ANTI are all negative and 
significant at the 1% level except that of Non-SOEs. In addition, the coefficients on ANTI*SOE 
_PC, ANTI*SOE CENTRAL_PC, ANTI*SOE LOCAL_PC and ANTI*NON-SOE_PC are all 
positive and not significant at conventional levels. These results indicate that after the campaign, 
all types of firms experience decreased investment expenditures, and there is little difference 
between those with and without political connections. One possible reason is that this campaign 
negatively impacts on Chinese firms widely.  
 
Regarding the effect of the campaign on investment efficiency of Chinese listed firms, as can be 
seen from Columns I and II of the table, the coefficients on both TQ*ANTI and 
TQ*ANTI*SOE_PC as well as those on both TQ*ANTI and TQ*ANTI*SOE CEN_PC are all 
insignificant at conventional levels, however, Column III shows that the coefficients on TQ*ANTI 
and TQ*ANTI*SOE LOC_PC are both positive with the latter significant at the 5% level. This 
result suggests that the campaign does not affect the investment efficiency of Central SOEs, 
whether they are politically connected or not. In addition, the investment efficiency of Local SOEs 
without political connections is not influenced by the campaign, however, that of politically 
connected Local SOEs is enhanced after the campaign. Finally, the investment efficiency of Non-
SOEs is improved after the campaign, whether they are politically connected or not, and the 
                                                                  
6 To save space, only the results of the key variables are shown in the table. 
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difference of the investment efficiency enhancement is not significant between those with and 
without political connections.  
 
In summary, the campaign causes a widely and significantly lower investment expenditure, all 
firms experience a great reduction in investment level. In addition, the investment efficiency of 
PC Local SOEs is improved and that of all Non-SOEs is enhanced and the enhancement shows no 
difference between PC Non-SOEs and NPC Non-SOEs (not politically connected Non-SOEs). 
 
Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
     
     VARIABLE I II III IV 
 SOEs SOEs-Central SOEs-Local Non-SOEs 
     ANTI -0.0322*** -0.0320***  -0.0259*** -0.0081 
 (-3.2341) (-4.6849) (-3.5825) (-0.1028) 
ANTI*SOE _PC 0.0078    
 (0.8417)    
ANTI*SOE CENTRAL_PC  0.0081   
  (0.8164)   
ANTI*SOE LOCAL_PC   0.0005  
   (0.0467)  
ANTI*NON-SOE_PC    0.0006 
    (1.1958) 
TQ*ANTI -0.0009 0.0020 0.0024 0.0016** 
 (-0.2829) (0.6488) (0.6178) (2.5185) 
TQ*ANTI*SOE_PC 0.0027    
 (0.4644)    
TQ*ANTI*SOE CEN_PC  -0.0050   
  (-1.1272)   
TQ*ANTI*SOE LOC_PC   0.0142**  
   (2.1066)  
TQ*ANTI*NON-SOE_PC    0.0008 
    (1.1811) 
          *, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports 
Difference-in-Differences Analysis. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, 
and 0 for otherwise. SOE is  state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOE_PC is politically connected 
SOEs. SOE Central/Cen_PC is politically connected SOEs controlled by the central government while SOE 
Local/Loc_PC is politically connected SOEs controlled by local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market 
value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term 
TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency 
of firms. TQ*ANTI*SOE is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and SOE. This study includes several control variables 
in the models.  CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets; 
Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one time 
period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets. 
Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses. 
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4.4 The effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on the investment 
behavior of politically connected firms. 
Here we investigate the influence of this regulation on investment behavior. We focus only on the 
firms with politically connected independent directors (POLDIR) and classify the firms into three 
groups – Central SOEs POLDIR, Local SOEs POLDIR and Non-SOEs POLDIR. Table 4 presents 
the results. As can be seen from Column I to Column VI, coefficients on ANTI are all negative 
and significant at the 1% level, indicating that after the campaign, the investment expenditures are 
much lower than those before the campaign for all types of firms with politically connected 
independent directors. The coefficients on TQ*ANTI in Columns I and III are both positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the investment efficiency of SOEs increases after the 
campaign and this enhancement of investment efficiency is due to the Local SOEs. In addition, 
the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
as shown in Column I, indicating that after the campaign, the decrease in politically connected 
independent directors causes lower investment efficiency for SOEs. Furthermore, the coefficients 
on both TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER and TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER 
are positive, as shown in Columns I and III, respectively, indicating that the investment efficiency 
of SOEs controlled both by the central government and by local governments decreases after the 
campaign. However, they are not significant at conventional levels. Finally, Column IV reports 
that the coefficients on ANTI*POLDIR_ PER and TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_ PER are positive and 
negative, respectively, both are significant at or better than the 10% level. This finding suggests 
that after the campaign, for Non-SOEs, the decrease in politically connected independent directors 
leads to decreased investment expenditures, but it causes enhanced investment efficiency. 
 
Table 4. The Effect of the Change in Politically Connected Independent Directors on Investment 
Behavior of Politically Connected Firms 
     
     VARIABLE I II III IV 
 SOEs SOEs-Central SOEs-Local Non-SOEs 
     C -0.0004 0.1217 0.1776 0.0823** 
 (-0.0049) (1.0239) (1.1467) (2.4198) 
TQ -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0023 0.0017*** 
 (-0.9752) (-0.7684) (-1.0784) (3.3278) 
ANTI -0.0242*** -0.0259*** -0.0193*** -0.0145*** 
 (-5.9947) (-4.3302) (-2.9346) (-8.2307) 
TQ*ANTI 0.0052*** 0.0020 0.0087*** 0.0005 
 (2.7975) (0.6063) (2.8423) (0.8876) 
SOEPC_POLDIR_PER 0.0027    
 (1.0682)    
TQ*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER -0.0012    
 (-0.6785)    
ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER -0.0134*    
 (-1.7662)    
TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER 0.0054**    
 (2.2059)    
SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER   0.0073  
   (0.8947)  
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Table 4 (continued)     
     
TQ*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER   -0.0008  
   (-0.3192)  
ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER  -0.0165  
   (-1.3687)  
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ 
PER 
 
 0.0049  
   (1.4195)  
SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER  0.0079   
  (1.0849)   
TQ*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER  0.0016   
  (0.4385)   
ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER -0.0086   
  (-0.7919)   
TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ 
PER 
 
0.0006   
  (0.1141)   
POLDIR_ PER    -0.0033 
    (-1.1078) 
TQ*POLDIR_ PER    0.0015 
    (1.4321) 
ANTI*POLDIR_ PER    0.0081** 
    (2.0929) 
Table 4 (continued)     
     
     
TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_ PER    -0.0024* 
    (-1.6836) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7212 0.8067 0.7281 0.6172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5616 0.6766 0.5372 0.4940 
F-statistic 4.5189*** 6.1982*** 3.8126*** 5.0106*** 
N 1358 416 682 5547 
     
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the 
effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on investment behavior of politically connected 
firms. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOE is 
state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOEPC is politically connected SOEs. 
SOECENPC_POLDIR_PER is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by the central 
government while SOELOCPC_POLDIR_PER is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by 
local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book 
value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after 
anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. POLDIR_PER is the percentage of politically connected 
AABFJ  |  Volume 14, No.1, 2020 
28 
independent directors.  TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_PER is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and POLDIR_PER. Finally, 
Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 1 to Table 4 indicate that the campaign does have an impact on 
investment behavior. After the campaign, all types of firms, whether they are politically connected 
or not, experience a significant reduction in investment expenditures. In addition, the investment 
efficiency for both PC Local SOEs and PC Non-SOEs is improved. Finally, the investment 
efficiency for both PC Local SOEs and PC Non-SOEs is enhanced after the campaign.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
 
5.1 An alternative proxy for the influence of politically connected independent directors 
In the last section, we use the change in the number of politically connected independent directors 
to examine the effect of Regulation No. 18 on investment behavior. Here, another proxy – the total 
number of politically connected independent directors– is utilized to investigate the campaign 
effect from another aspect. The results are reported in Table 5. As can be seen from Column I, the 
coefficient on ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM is negative and significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that after the campaign, the number of politically connected independent directors is 
negatively related to investment expenditures for SOEs. One possible reason is that after the 
campaign, politically independent directors put less pressure on Local SOEs to overinvest. In 
addition, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM is positive and significant at the 
5% level, suggesting that after the campaign, a higher number of politically independent directors 
leads to better investment efficiency, and this effect is mainly due to the Local SOEs, as is 
evidenced by the positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient on 
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM. Furthermore, Column IV shows that the coefficient on 
ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that after the 
campaign, for Non-SOEs, politically connected independent directors induce more investment 
expenditures. Finally, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is negative and significant at 
the 10% level, suggesting that after the campaign, for Non-SOEs, lower number of politically 
connected independent directors leads to higher investment efficiency. 
 
Table 5. The Effect of the Number of Politically Connected Independent Directors on Investment 
Behavior 
     
     VARIABLE I II III IV 
 SOEs SOEs-Central SOEs-Local Non-SOEs 
     C -0.0174 0.1351 0.1913* 0.0686** 
 (-0.2340) (1.1179) (1.8206) (2.1506) 
TQ -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0006 0.0015*** 
 (-0.2557) (-0.4925) (-0.4151) (3.1687) 
ANTI -0.0225*** -0.0223*** -0.0157** -0.0153*** 
 (-6.2311) (-3.9653) (-2.4413) (-9.1739) 
TQ*ANTI 0.0045** -0.0001 0.0061*** 0.0006 
 (2.7328) (-0.0268) (2.9572) (1.019) 
SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM 0.0027    
 (1.0682)    
TQ*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM -0.0008    
 (-0.8317)    
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Table 5 (continued)     
     
ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM -0.0073*    
 (-1.8048)    
TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM 0.0032**    
 (1.9940)    
SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM   0.0051  
   (1.4687)  
TQ*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM   -0.0008  
   (-0.5882)  
ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM   -0.0122**  
   (-2.314)  
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM   0.0038*  
   (1.7812)  
SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM  -0.0008   
  (-0.2001)   
TQ*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM  0.0023   
  (0.9294)   
ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM  0.0024   
  (0.3881)   
TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM  -0.0021   
  (-0.6257)   
POLDIR_SUM    -0.0010 
    (-0.6945) 
TQ*POLDIR_SUM    0.0003 
    (0.6731) 
ANTI*POLDIR_SUM    0.0035* 
    (1.7276) 
TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM    -0.0014* 
    (-1.8099) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7141 0.7915 0.7274 0.6123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5579 0.6570 0.5502 0.4960 
F-statistic 4.5700*** 5.8858*** 4.1041*** 5.2642*** 
N 1512 455 765 6129 
     
     *, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the 
effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on investment behavior of politically connected 
firms. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOE is 
state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOEPC is politically connected SOEs. 
SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by the central 
government while SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by 
local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book 
value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after 
anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. POLDIR_SUM is the change in the number of politically 
connected independent directors.  TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and 
POLDIR_SUM. Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
5.2 An alternative way to measure investment efficiency 
 
We use a model to predict a firm’s investment efficiency, following Wang, Zhu and Hoffmire 
(2015). We then take the residuals, which represent the deviations from predicted investment, from 
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the model to proxy for investment inefficiency. A positive residual is classified as overinvestment 
while a negative deviation is assigned as underinvestment. Finally, to determine how the campaign 
affects the investment efficiency of Chinese politically connected firms, we regress the residuals 
on ANTI for positive and negative groups, respectively. The results are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. The Effect of The Anti-Corruption Campaign on Overinvestment and Underinvestment Problems 
    
    VARIABLE (I) Overinvestment  (II) Underinvestment
    Panel A: SOEs    
ANTI -0.0018 (-0.5467)  0.0022(1.2543) 
Panel B: SOEs-Central    
ANTI -0.0106**(-2.1342)  0.0016(0.5292)  
Panel C: SOEs-Local    
ANTI -0.0037(-0.7021)  0.0043*(1.9218 
Panel D: Non-SOEs    
ANTI -0.0031**(-2.2762)  0.0025***(2.9130) 
    *, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports The 
effect of the anti-corruption campaign on overinvestment and underinvestment problems. ANTI is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOEs are state-owned enterprises, while 
Non-SOEs are otherwise. SOEs-Central is SOEs controlled by the central government. SOEs-Local is SOEs controlled 
by the local government T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses. 
 
The results show that, on average, the anti-corruption campaign implemented in China does affect 
the investment behavior of Chinese listed firm. After the campaign, all types of firms  encounter 
great reduction in investment level. In addition, PC Local SOEs experience better investment 
efficiency due to the mitigated underinvestment and PC Non-SOEs have improved investment 
efficiency because of their less severe under- and over-investment. 
Taken together, the results of the robustness checks in this study reveal that our main findings are 
robust to alternative proxies and difference-in-differences test. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This research empirically analyzes the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the investment 
behavior of Chinese politically connected firms. We hypothesize that the campaign may lead to 
lower investment expenditures for all types of politically connected firms and cause enhancement 
of investment efficiency for politically connected SOEs while that of Non-SOEs may be harmed. 
The findings of this paper on average support our hypotheses and demonstrate the impact of the 
campaign on the investment behavior of Chinese politically connected firms. However, one result 
is intriguing, that is, after the campaign, the investment efficiency of PC Non-SOEs is better than 
that before the campaign. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis1, which we predict a lower 
investment efficiency after the campaign. We find, from our robustness test that, this enhancement 
of investment efficiency is due to the mitigation of both under- and over-investment. This may be 
because it becomes more difficult for PC Non-SOEs to raise funds externally when losing political 
connections so that they make investment decisions more cautiously, thereby mitigating 
overinvestment problem. In addition, after the campaign, the investment opportunities of Chinese 
stock markets reduce sharply, leading to much lower underinvestment for PC Non-SOEs. 
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Political connections are pervasive, especially in emerging markets. Researchers are encouraged 
to examine the influence of political connections on corporate policy in common, and on financial 
policy, in particular, to shed more light on the impact of these connections on capital market 
development.  
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